British Salonika Force

The British government and War Office were unwilling participants in the Macedonian campaign. When military assistance to Serbia was first discussed, the Gallipoli landings were being planned and the request was regarded as an unacceptable extra draw on the limited resources available; despite this, however, the 29th Division was first allocated to a landing at Salonika.

There were also political complications because Greece would have to be the base and the Royal and Venizelist factions there had widely differing war aims and demands. The final decision was dependent on the withdrawal from Gallipoli and French coercion. However, Egypt and later Palestine then became the primary British priorities in the Eastern Mediterranean - to put this in perspective the British Salonika Army was under the administrative control of the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt until September 1916 - and the overall level of direct military support was much less than that provided by the French.

The first troops - the tired and under-strength 10th Division - were sent from Mudros to Salonika in October 1915 followed by five divisions from France; four (22nd, 26th, 27th & 28th) between October and January 1916 (originally intended to replace French troops at Kum Kale or for a diversionary landing in the Gulf of Alexandretta) and the fifth (60th) in December 1916. Three (22nd, 26th & 60th) were fresh but still very inexperienced when they arrived having spent only a few weeks each in the line in France. The other two (27th & 28th) were regular divisions made up from battalions transferred from the Middle and Far East after the outbreak of war. Arriving in Flanders in mid-winter the troops suffered badly from the cold and damp and the resulting sick list was huge. The divisions saw heavy fighting at Ypres in April, and the 28th lost heavily again at Loos, but both reached Salonika via Egypt where some time was spent in rest and retraining. 

The War Office continued to demonstrate its reservations, and other priorities, by restricting the activities of the force, effectively excluding it from any significant offensive action before the April 1917 Battle of Doiran and that only after French insistence. Until 1918 it looked on the British Salonika Force as a strategic reserve for the Middle East so, when planning began for the Jerusalem campaign in the summer of 1917, two divisions (10th & 60th), most of the mounted troops and some heavy artillery were moved to Egypt from Macedonia as reinforcements (although much of the artillery was replaced in 1918). On top of this, twelve battalions - almost a quarter of the remaining infantry - were sent to France and Flanders in mid-1918. These reductions in strength, although undoubtedly necessary, eliminated any remaining ability of the British force to conduct effective offensive action after mid-1917. This in turn should have seriously affected morale so it is to the force’s credit that although its role in the final offensive was only diversionary it was conducted as vigorously as possible, at appalling cost to such a small force.

Equipment lagged behind France and Flanders in quality and quantity. This was due in part to the low priority accorded Macedonia by the War Office but supply was also affected by enemy submarine action on the main routes from the UK and Marseilles in 1917 and 1918 and the small capacity of, and other demands on, the alternative route through Italy and across the Adriatic. Most seriously, the allotment of heavy artillery remained tiny in comparison to France and Flanders with too many guns and not enough howitzers for the mountainous terrain; plans to increase the allocation of mountain artillery to the divisions had to be abandoned for the want of guns and pack animals. The small air component used obsolescent types until late 1917 when the first modern aircraft appeared, but it was mid-1918 (coincident with the formation of a separate Royal Air Force) before they were made available in any quantity. 

However, the biggest problem facing the force as a whole, and the infantry in particular, was reinforcements. Virtually none were sent from the UK after the end of 1916 and the constant drain of manpower from malaria meant that battalion rifle strengths rarely rose above 500. For example, by mid-1918 7/South Wales Borderers contained men from at least 24 different regiments and corps including the Royal Army Medical Corps and Army Service Corps.

Although the order of battle concentrates on the fighting arms the contribution of the services was - as ever - vitally important to the conduct of the campaign. When the 10th and 22nd Divisions arrived there were virtually no roads in the country and the Royal Engineers oversaw a major road construction and maintenance programme. Even with these improvements the terrain nearer the front was unsuitable for horse-drawn transport so infantry divisions made extensive use of pack transport instead, until restricted by the need to send mules to Palestine in 1917. This was supported by large numbers of motor vehicles; 3,500 were in use at the end of the war, both light Ford vans and heavier lorries. As well as supporting its own troops the Army Service Corps sent ten companies to help the French and Serbians, one of which was awarded a unit Croix de Guerre for its part in the final offensive. Also, the British troops were badly affected by the harsh Macedonian climate and sickness or disease killed or disabled far more than enemy fire. Although restricted in the treatments available the Royal Army Medical Corps worked hard to combat malaria and the other endemic diseases, without them scarcely a man would have been fit to fight.